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American Primacy
in Perspective
Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth
from strength to strength
More than a decade ago, political columnist Charles
Krauthammer proclaimed in these pages the arrival of what he called
a “unipolar moment,” a period in which one superpower, the United
States, stood clearly above the rest of the international community
(“The Unipolar Moment,” America and the World 1990/91). In the
following years the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia’s economic and
military decline accelerated, and Japan stagnated, while the United
States experienced the longest and one of the most vigorous economic
expansions in its history. Yet toward the close of the century readers
could find political scientist Samuel Huntington arguing here that
unipolarity had already given way to a “uni-multipolar” structure, which
in turn would soon become unambiguously multipolar (“The Lonely
Superpower,” March/April 1999). And despite the boasting rhetoric
of American o⁄cials, Huntington was not alone in his views. Polls
showed that more than 40 percent of Americans had come to agree
that the United States was now merely one of several leading powers—
a number that had risen steadily for several years.
Why did the unipolarity argument seem less persuasive to many
even as U.S. power appeared to grow? Largely because the goal posts
were moved. Krauthammer’s definition of unipolarity, as a system
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that had been so clearly shaped by the existence of two poles. People
sensed intuitively that a world with no great power capable of sustaining
a focused rivalry with the United States would be very diªerent in
important ways.
But a decade later what increasingly seemed salient was less the
absence of a peer rival than the persistence of a number of problems
in the world that Washington could not dispose of by itself. This was
the context for Huntington’s new definition of unipolarity, as a system
with “one superpower, no significant major powers, and many minor
powers.” The dominant power in such a system, he argued, would be
able to “eªectively resolve important international issues alone, and
no combination of other states would have the power to prevent it
from doing so.” The United States had no such ability and thus did
not qualify.
The terrorist attacks last fall appeared to some to reinforce this
point, revealing not only a remarkable degree of American vulnerability
but also a deep vein of global anti-American resentment. Suddenly
the world seemed a more threatening place, with dangers lurking at
every corner and eternal vigilance the price of liberty. Yet as the suc-
cess of the military campaign in Afghanistan demonstrated, vulner-
ability to terror has few eªects on U.S. strength in more traditional
interstate aªairs. If anything, America’s response to the attacks—
which showed its ability to project power in several places around the
globe simultaneously, and essentially unilaterally, while eªortlessly
increasing defense spending by nearly $50 billion—only reinforced its
unique position.
If today’s American primacy does not constitute unipolarity, then
nothing ever will. The only things left for dispute are how long it will
last and what the implications are for American foreign policy.
pick a measure, any measure
To understand just how dominant the United States is today, one
needs to look at each of the standard components of national power
in succession. In the military arena, the United States is poised to
spend more on defense in 2003 than the next 15–20 biggest spenders
combined. The United States has overwhelming nuclear superiority,
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the world’s dominant air force, the only truly blue-water navy, and a
unique capability to project power around the globe. And its military
advantage is even more apparent in quality than in quantity. The
United States leads the world in exploiting the military applications
of advanced communications and information technology and it
has demonstrated an unrivaled ability to coordinate and process
information about the battlefield and destroy targets from afar with
extraordinary precision. Washington is not making it easy for others
to catch up, moreover, given the massive gap in spending on military
research and development (R&D), on which the United States spends
three times more than the next six powers combined. Looked at
another way, the United States currently spends more on military R&D
than Germany or the United Kingdom spends on defense in total.
No state in the modern history of international politics has come
close to the military predominance these numbers suggest. And the
United States purchases this preeminence with only 3.5 percent of its
gdp. As historian Paul Kennedy notes, “being Number One at great
cost is one thing; being the world’s single superpower on the cheap
is astonishing.”
America’s economic dominance, meanwhile—relative to either
the next several richest powers or the rest of the world combined—
surpasses that of any great power in modern history, with the sole
exception of its own position after 1945 (when World War II had
temporarily laid waste every other major economy). The U.S. economy
is currently twice as large as its closest rival, Japan. California’s
economy alone has risen to become the fifth largest in the world
(using market exchange-rate estimates), ahead of France and just
behind the United Kingdom.
It is true that the long expansion of the 1990s has ebbed, but it
would take an experience like Japan’s in that decade—that is, an
extraordinarily deep and prolonged domestic recession juxtaposed
with robust growth elsewhere—for the United States just to fall back
to the economic position it occupied in 1991. The odds against such rel-
ative decline are long, however, in part because the United States is the
country in the best position to take advantage of globalization. Its
status as the preferred destination for scientifically trained foreign
workers solidified during the 1990s, and it is the most popular destination
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for foreign firms. In 1999 it attracted more than one-third of world
inflows of foreign direct investment.
U.S. military and economic dominance, finally, is rooted in the
country’s position as the world’s leading technological power. Al-
though measuring national R&D spending is increasingly di⁄cult
in an era in which so many economic activities cross borders, eªorts
to do so indicate America’s continuing lead. Figures from the late
1990s showed that U.S. expenditures on
R&D nearly equaled those of the next
seven richest countries combined.
Measuring the degree of American dom-
inance in each category begins to place things
in perspective. But what truly distinguishes
the current international system is American
dominance in all of them simultaneously.
Previous leading states in the modern era were either great commercial
and naval powers or great military powers on land, never both. The
British Empire in its heyday and the United States during the Cold
War, for example, each shared the world with other powers that
matched or exceeded them in some areas. Following the Napoleonic
Wars, the United Kingdom was clearly the world’s leading commercial
and naval power. But even at the height of the Pax Britannica, the
United Kingdom was outspent, outmanned, and outgunned by both
France and Russia. And its 24 percent share of gdp among the six lead-
ing powers in the early 1870s was matched by the United States, with
Russia and Germany following close behind. Similarly, at the dawn of
the Cold War the United States was clearly dominant economically
as well as in air and naval capabilities. But the Soviet Union retained
overall military parity, and thanks to geography and investment in land
power it had a superior ability to seize territory in Eurasia.
Today, in contrast, the United States has no rival in any critical
dimension of power. There has never been a system of sovereign
states that contained one state with this degree of dominance. The
recent tendency to equate unipolarity with the ability to achieve desired
outcomes single-handedly on all issues only reinforces this point; in no
previous international system would it ever have occurred to anyone to
apply such a yardstick.
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Many who acknowledge the extent of American power, however,
regard it as necessarily self-negating. Other states traditionally band
together to restrain potential hegemons, they say, and this time will
be no diªerent. As German political commentator Josef Joªe has put
it, “the history books say that Mr. Big always invites his own demise.
Nos. 2, 3, 4 will gang up on him, form countervailing alliances and
plot his downfall. That happened to Napoleon, as it happened to
Louis xiv and the mighty Hapsburgs, to Hitler and to Stalin. Power
begets superior counterpower; it’s the oldest rule of world politics.”
What such arguments fail to recognize are the features of America’s
post–Cold War position that make it likely to buck the historical
trend. Bounded by oceans to the east and west and weak, friendly
powers to the north and south, the United States is both less vulner-
able than previous aspiring hegemons and also less threatening to others.
The main potential challengers to its unipolarity, meanwhile—
China, Russia, Japan, and Germany—are in the opposite position.
They cannot augment their military capabilities so as to balance the
United States without simultaneously becoming an immediate threat
to their neighbors. Politics, even international politics, is local. Although
American power attracts a lot of attention globally, states are usually
more concerned with their own neighborhoods than with the global
equilibrium. Were any of the potential challengers to make a serious
run at the United States, regional balancing eªorts would almost
certainly help contain them, as would the massive latent power capa-
bilities of the United States, which could be mobilized as necessary
to head oª an emerging threat.
When analysts refer to a historical pattern of balancing against
potentially preponderant powers, they rarely note that the cases in
question—the Hapsburg ascendancy, Napoleonic France, the Soviet
Union in the Cold War, and so forth—featured would-be hegemons
that were vulnerable, threatening, centrally located, and dominant
in only one or two components of power. Moreover, the would-be
hegemons all specialized in precisely the form of power—the ability
to seize territory—most likely to scare other states into an antihegemonic
coalition. American capabilities, by contrast, are relatively greater
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and more comprehensive than those of past hegemonic aspirants,
they are located safely oªshore, and the prospective balancers are
close regional neighbors of one another. U.S. power is also at the
command of one government, whereas the putative balancers would
face major challenges in acting collectively to assemble and coordinate
their military capabilities.
Previous historical experiences of balancing, moreover, involved
groups of status quo powers seeking to contain a rising revisionist
one. The balancers had much to fear if the aspiring hegemon got its
way. Today, however, U.S. dominance is the status quo. Several of the
major powers in the system have been closely allied with the United
States for decades and derive substantial benefits from their position.
Not only would they have to forego those benefits if they tried to
balance, but they would have to find some way of putting together
a durable, coherent alliance while America was watching. This is a
profoundly important point, because although there may be several
precedents for a coalition of balancers preventing a hegemon from
emerging, there is none for a group of subordinate powers joining to
topple a hegemon once it has already emerged, which is what would
have to happen today.
The comprehensive nature of U.S. power, finally, also skews the
odds against any major attempt at balancing, let alone a successful
one. The United States is both big and rich, whereas the potential
challengers are all either one or the other. It will take at least a
generation for today’s other big countries (such as China and India)
to become rich, and given declining birth rates the other rich powers
are not about to get big, at least in relative terms. During the 1990s,
the U.S. population increased by 32.7 million—a figure equal to more
than half the current population of France or the United Kingdom.
Some might argue that the European Union is an exception to the
big-or-rich rule. It is true that if Brussels were to develop impressive mil-
itary capabilities and wield its latent collective power like a state, the eu
would clearly constitute another pole. But the creation of an autonomous
and unified defense and defense-industrial capacity that could compete
with that of the United States would be a gargantuan task. The eu is
struggling to put together a 60,000-strong rapid reaction force that is de-
signed for smaller operations such as humanitarian relief, peacekeeping,
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and crisis management, but it still lacks military essentials such as
capabilities in intelligence gathering, airlift, air-defense suppression,
air-to-air refueling, sea transport, medical care, and combat search and
rescue—and even when it has those capacities, perhaps by the end of this
decade, it will still rely on nato command and control and other assets.
Whatever capability the eu eventually assembles, moreover, will
matter only to the extent that it is under the control of a statelike
decision-making body with the authority to act quickly and decisively
in Europe’s name. Such authority, which does not yet exist even for in-
ternational financial matters, could be purchased only at the price of
a direct frontal assault on European nations’ core sovereignty. And all
of this would have to occur as the eu expands to add ten or more new
member states, a process that will complicate further deepening.
Given these obstacles, Europe is unlikely to
emerge as a dominant actor in the military
realm for a very long time, if ever.
Most analysts looking for a future peer
competitor to the United States, therefore,
focus on China, since it is the only power
with the potential to match the size of the
U.S. economy over the next several decades.
Yet even if China were eventually to catch up to the United States in
terms of aggregate gdp, the gaps in the two states’ other power capa-
bilities—technological, military, and geographic—would remain.
Since the mid-1990s, Chinese strategists themselves have become
markedly less bullish about their country’s ability to close the gap in
what they call “comprehensive national power” any time soon. The
latest estimates by China’s intelligence agency project that in 2020 the
country will possess between slightly more than a third and slightly
more than half of U.S. capabilities. Fifty percent of China’s labor
force is employed in agriculture, and relatively little of its economy is
geared toward high technology. In the 1990s, U.S. spending on tech-
nological development was more than 20 times China’s. Most of
China’s weapons are decades old. And nothing China can do will
allow it to escape its geography, which leaves it surrounded by coun-
tries that have the motivation and ability to engage in balancing of
their own should China start to build up an expansive military force.
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American foreign 
policy today operates 
in the realm of 
choice, not necessity.
These are not just facts about the current system; they are recog-
nized as such by the major players involved. As a result, no global
challenge to the United States is likely to emerge for the foreseeable
future. No country, or group of countries, wants to maneuver itself
into a situation in which it will have to contend with the focused
enmity of the United States.
Two of the prime causes of past great-power conflicts—hegemonic
rivalry and misperception—are thus not currently operative in world
politics. At the dawn of the twentieth century, a militarily powerful
Germany challenged the United Kingdom’s claim to leadership. The
result was World War I. In the middle of the twentieth century,
American leadership seemed under challenge by a militarily and ideo-
logically strong Soviet Union. The result was the Cold War. U.S.
dominance today militates against a comparable challenge, however,
and hence against a comparable global conflict. Because the United
States is too powerful to balance, moreover, there is far less danger of
war emerging from the misperceptions, miscalculations, arms races,
and so forth that have traditionally plagued balancing attempts.
Pundits often lament the absence of a post–Cold War Bismarck.
Luckily, as long as unipolarity lasts, there is no need for one.
unipolar politics as usual
The conclusion that balancing is not in the cards may strike many
as questionable in light of the parade of ostensibly anti-U.S. diplomatic
combinations in recent years: the “European troika” of France, Germany,
and Russia; the “special relationship” between Germany and Russia;
the “strategic triangle” of Russia, China, and India; the “strategic
partnership” between China and Russia; and so on. Yet a close look
at any of these arrangements reveals their rhetorical as opposed to
substantive character. Real balancing involves real economic and
political costs, which neither Russia, nor China, nor indeed any other
major power has shown any willingness to bear.
The most reliable way to balance power is to increase defense outlays.
Since 1995, however, military spending by most major powers has
been declining relative to gdp, and in the majority of cases in absolute
terms as well. At most, these opposing coalitions can occasionally
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succeed in frustrating U.S. policy initiatives when the expected costs
of doing so remain conveniently low. At the same time, Beijing,
Moscow, and others have demonstrated a willingness to cooperate
with the United States periodically on strategic matters and especially
in the economic realm. This general tendency toward bandwagoning was
the norm before September 11 and has only become more pronounced
since then.
Consider the Sino-Russian “strategic partnership,” the most promi-
nent instance of apparent balancing to date. The easy retort to overheated
rhetoric about a Moscow-Beijing “axis” would involve pointing out
how it failed to slow, much less stop, President Vladimir Putin’s
geopolitical sprint toward Washington in the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks. More telling, however, is just how tenuous
the shift was even before it was thrown oª track. At no point did the
partnership entail any costly commitment or policy coordination
against Washington that might have risked a genuine confrontation.
The keystone of the partnership—Russia’s arms sales to China—
reflects a symmetry of weaknesses, rather than the potential of
combined strengths. The sales partially oªset China’s backward mil-
itary technology while helping to slow the decline of Russia’s defense
industries. Most of the arms in question are legacies of the R&D
eªorts of the Soviet military-industrial complex, and given Moscow’s
paltry R&D budget today, few of these systems will long remain
competitive with their U.S. or nato analogues.
Even as the two neighbors signed cooperative agreements, moreover,
deep suspicions continued to plague their relationship, economic ties
between them remained anemic and unlikely to grow dramatically,
and both were highly dependent on inflows of capital and technology
that could come only from the West. Russian and Chinese leaders
highlighted their desire for a world of reduced U.S. influence not
because this was a goal toward which they had actually started moving,
but because it was one general principle on which they could agree.
Balancing rhetoric is obviously partly the reflection of genuine
sentiment. The world finds it unfair, undemocratic, annoying, and
sometimes downright frightening to have so much power concentrated
in the hands of one state, especially when the United States aggressively
goes its own way. But given the weight and prominence of U.S. power
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on the world stage, some unease among other countries is inevitable
no matter what Washington does. Foreign governments frequently
rail against what they regard as excessive U.S. involvement in their
aªairs. Yet inflated expectations about what the United States can do
to solve global problems (such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) can
lead to frustration with supposed U.S. underengagement as well.
Nothing the United States could do short of abdicating its power
would solve the problem completely.
Local and regional politics also contribute to balancing rhetoric,
although not to its substance. Even nondemagogic leaders face incen-
tives to play on anti-American resentment for domestic audiences.
And simple math dictates the need for more regional cooperation
today than previously, much of which can take on an anti-American
coloring. The nineteenth-century international system featured six to
eight poles among roughly 30 states. In the early Cold War, there were
two poles, but the number of states had doubled to just over 70. Today
there is one pole in a system in which the population has trebled to
nearly 200. Inevitably, therefore, much activity will take place at a
regional level, and it can often be in the interests of the parties involved
to use balancing rhetoric as a rallying point for stimulating cooperation,
even if that is not the chief driver of their actions.
Such maneuvering has the potential to backfire, however, by re-
inforcing the perception that the countries in question are too weak to act
individually, something that can have harmful consequences at home
and abroad. Thus, other powers have to find a way of reminding Wash-
ington that they have somewhere else to turn, but without talking down
their own capabilities or foreclosing promising bilateral arrangements
with the United States. The result—balancing that is rhetorically grand
but substantively weak—is politics as usual in a unipolar world.
so what?
The first and most important practical consequence of unipolarity
for the United States is notable for its absence: the lack of hegemonic
rivalry. During the Cold War the United States confronted a military
superpower with the potential to conquer all the industrial power
centers of Europe and Asia. To forestall that catastrophic outcome,
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for decades the United States committed between 5 and 14 percent of
its gdp to defense spending and maintained an extended nuclear
deterrent that put a premium on the credibility of its commitments.
Largely to maintain a reputation for resolve, 85,000 Americans lost
their lives in two Asian wars while U.S. presidents repeatedly engaged
in brinkmanship that ran the risk of escalation to global thermo-
nuclear destruction.
Today the costs and dangers of the Cold War have faded into history,
but they need to be kept in mind in order to assess unipolarity accurately.
For decades to come, no state is likely to combine the resources, ge-
ography, and growth rates necessary to mount a hegemonic challenge
on such a scale—an astonishing development. Crowns may generally
lie uneasy, but America’s does not.
Some might question the worth of being at the top of a unipolar
system if that means serving as a lightning rod for the world’s mal-
contents. When there was a Soviet Union, after all, it bore the brunt
of Osama bin Laden’s anger, and only after its collapse did he shift
his focus to the United States (an indicator of the demise of bipolarity
that was ignored at the time but looms larger
in retrospect). But terrorism has been a
perennial problem in history, and multipolarity
did not save the leaders of several great pow-
ers from assassination by anarchists around
the turn of the twentieth century. In fact, a
slide back toward multipolarity would actually
be the worst of all worlds for the United States. In such a scenario it
would continue to lead the pack and serve as a focal point for resent-
ment and hatred by both state and nonstate actors, but it would have
fewer carrots and sticks to use in dealing with the situation. The
threats would remain, but the possibility of eªective and coordinated
action against them would be reduced.
The second major practical consequence of unipolarity is the unique
freedom it oªers American policymakers. Many decisionmakers labor
under feelings of constraint, and all participants in policy debates
defend their preferred courses of action by pointing to the dire con-
sequences that will follow if their advice is not accepted. But the
sources of American strength are so varied and so durable that U.S.
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The iron fist of American
power should be covered
with a velvet glove.
foreign policy today operates in the realm of choice rather than
necessity to a greater degree than any other power in modern history.
Whether the participants realize it or not, this new freedom to
choose has transformed the debate over what the U.S. role in the
world should be.
Historically, the major forces pushing powerful states toward
restraint and magnanimity have been the limits of their strength and
the fear of overextension and balancing. Great powers typically
checked their ambitions and deferred to others not because they
wanted to but because they had to in order to win the cooperation
they needed to survive and prosper. It is thus no surprise that today’s
champions of American moderation and international benevolence
stress the constraints on American power rather than the lack of
them. Political scientist Joseph Nye, for example, insists that “[the
term] unipolarity is misleading because it exaggerates the degree to
which the United States is able to get the results it wants in some
dimensions of world politics. ... American power is less eªective than
it might first appear.” And he cautions that if the United States “handles
its hard power in an overbearing, unilateral manner,” then others
might be provoked into forming a balancing coalition.
Such arguments are unpersuasive, however, because they fail to
acknowledge the true nature of the current international system. The
United States cannot be scared into meekness by warnings of ine⁄cacy
or potential balancing. Isolationists and aggressive unilateralists see this
situation clearly, and their domestic opponents need to as well. Now
and for the foreseeable future, the United States will have immense
power resources it can bring to bear to force or entice others to do its
bidding on a case-by-case basis.
But just because the United States is strong enough to act heedlessly
does not mean that it should do so. Why not? Because it can aªord
to reap the greater gains that will eventually come from magnanimity.
Aside from a few cases in a few issue areas, ignoring others’ concerns
avoids hassles today at the cost of more serious trouble tomorrow.
Unilateralism may produce results in the short term, but it is apt to
reduce the pool of voluntary help from other countries that the
United States can draw on down the road, and thus in the end to
make life more di⁄cult rather than less. Unipolarity makes it possible
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to be the global bully—but it also oªers the United States the luxury
of being able to look beyond its immediate needs to its own, and the
world’s, long-term interests.
resisting temptation
Consider the question that preoccupied many observers before
September 11: whether to engage or contain potential great-power
challengers such as China. Supporters of engagement argued that the
best way to moderate Chinese behavior (both internal and external)
was to tie the country into the international political and economic
system as thoroughly as possible. Supporters of containment, mean-
while, argued that this course was far too risky, because it might hasten
the emergence of a strong but still tyrannical power. To the extent that
the above analysis of unipolarity is correct, however, the risks that
accompany engagement are minor, because the margin of U.S. superior-
ity is so great that China is unlikely to pose a significant challenge to U.S.
dominance for decades, no matter what policy is followed. Although
engagement may not succeed, therefore, the chance that it might makes
it worth a try, and there will be plenty of time to reverse course if it fails.
The same applies with even more force to Russia. The aftermath
of the September 11 attacks demonstrated the benefits of having a
stable friend in Eurasia’s heartland, and the preceding three centuries
demonstrated the high costs that could come from an autocratic
Russia that is extracting military capabilities from its vast territory.
Integrating Russia fully into the reigning international order would
represent a major step toward eliminating the perennial “Russia prob-
lem.” Russia’s political and economic institutions have a long road to
travel before such integration becomes feasible, of course, but thanks
to unipolarity there is plenty of time to wait, and there are plenty of
resources to deploy in helping.
Washington also needs to be concerned about the level of resentment
that an aggressive unilateral course would engender among its major
allies. After all, it is influence, not power, that is ultimately most valuable.
The further one looks beyond the immediate short term, the clearer
become the many issues—the environment, disease, migration, and
the stability of the global economy, to name a few—that the United
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States cannot solve on its own. Such issues entail repeated dealings
with many partners over many years. Straining relationships now will
lead only to a more challenging policy environment later on.
As for the developing world, if the United States could help improve
political, social, and economic conditions there, practically everybody
would benefit—the locals directly, and the rest of the world indirectly.
No magic wand can transform the situation overnight, but the United
States can nevertheless take a variety of measures that would help on
the margins. The most important would be to lower the high protec-
tionist trade barriers Washington maintains for agricultural products,
clothing, and textiles—all crucial for the economic prospects of much
of the developing world. Opening up U.S. markets to developing-
country exports in these areas would not guarantee rapid economic
development abroad, and even if it did, rapid development is not a
panacea for all ills. But there is little doubt that it would help the
exporting countries’ economies and societies along with America’s image.
President George W. Bush recently said, “To be serious about
fighting poverty, we must be serious about expanding trade. ...
Greater access to the markets of wealthy countries has a direct and
immediate impact on the economies of developing nations.” But
deeds are more important than words. Lowering domestic trade
barriers would be precisely the kind of U.S. policy that could reduce
the inevitable frictions and resentments unipolarity generates. It
would mean going beyond reacting to security challenges once they
became critical and trying to forestall their emergence in the first
place. Implemented fully and expanded to other cases, this approach
could serve as the velvet glove covering the iron fist of American
power, demonstrating that the United States was interested in not
just its own special interests but the interests of others as well.
Magnanimity and restraint in the face of temptation are tenets of
successful statecraft that have proved their worth from classical Greece
onward. Standing taller than leading states of the past, the United
States has unprecedented freedom to do as it pleases. It can play the
game for itself alone or for the system as a whole; it can focus on small
returns today or larger ones tomorrow. If the administration truly wants
to be loved as well as feared, the policy answers are not hard to find.∂
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